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LEGAL ASPECTS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY
J.F. Hogg
I think you will agree that the title
for this morning's talk is odd to say the
least. You have studied, thought, talked
about and listened to various facets of
the problem of counterinsurgency-the
political factors, the sociological, economic, and even the military factors.
But what on earth does law have to do
with this subject?
Some of you will have remembered
your experience during the International Law Study earlier this year and
perhaps have jumped to the conclusion
that, without lawyers, the subject of
counterinsurgency would be too clearit needs someone to muddy the waters,
to cast doubt and confusion where
understanding and clarity existed before.
Let me illustrate. Take the definition
of insurgency provided you last Wednesday from the Dictionary of [United
States} Military Terms.! ''InsurgencyA condition resulting from a revolt or
insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war.
In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited. "Notice
that we are supposed to be talking
about a revolt or insurrection which
falls short of civil war. What is a civil
war, about which we are not to talk? A
search of the same dictionary provides
no definition of these two words. Do
you suppose that the man on the street

would describe that Mr. Castro engaged
in in Cuba as a "civil war"? How about
Ho Chi Minh's efforts-aren't they a
civil war? Are North and South Vietnam
two different countries, or different
segments of the one country? Further,
are there not sizable numbers of South
Vietnamese fighting with the Viet Cong
against the South Vietnamese government forces? Are those not elements of
a civil war? Could we not describe the
Santo Domingo situation as a civil war?
In short, doesn't the exclusion of civil
war from consideration in the subject of
"counterinsurgency" exclude much of
the most important material to he considered? And, in any case, what reason
could the authors of the. definition have
had for drawing a distinction hetween
an insurrection and a civil war? Isn't the
problem one of subversive aggression or
wars of liberation? And can't you have a
war of liberation taking the form of a
civil war just as well as some other
form?
There, you see, I told you that a
lawyer and a legal analysis would make
no positive contribution to your study
of the suhject of counterinsurgency.
Only a lawyer could he so distracted
and fail to see the real problem. As with
the case of Mike the hurglar who was
caught red-handed and hailed into
court, help from lawyers should be
declined. When the judge asked Mike
why he had refused to be defended by a
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lawyer, Mike said: "It's too late nowthe time when I needed a lawyer was
when I was making my plans to rob the
joint. If I had had a good lawyer then,
you would never have caught me with
the goods. "
Now therein doth lie a moral. It is
frequently forgotten that one of the
most significant functions that a lawyer
can perform is to counsel his client and
advise him about the plans and conduct
which his client intends for the future.
Another important function is to serve
as an advocate of his client's positionto present the case in the best and most
favorable light possible.
If this morning's subject were to send
us off in pursuit of abstract rules of
international law, derived from treaties
or customary law, in the fond hope that
by adequate research of the precedents
at the same time so plausible and so
convincing that even Mr. Lin Piao or Ho
Chi Minh would recognize the justice of
our cause-then indeed, law has no
useful function to perform in this area.
If, however, we start looking for a
consistent framework in which to couch
our response to the concept and practice of wars of liberation, if we start
looking for the most persuasive arguments in which to dress our policies of
counterinsurgency, if before taking
counterinsurgency action we pause to
consider the relative plausibility and
persuasiveness of arguments in support
which, after the act, it will be possible
to make-then indeed, legal analysis
may have a more useful function to
perform in this area.
But, you will be saying, if that is the
function to be served by legal analysis as
applied to counterinsurgency, how does
legal analysis differ from psychological
warfare? How indeed! Look again, at
the military dictionary definition of
"counterinsurgency." Law isn't mentioned, but psychological action is. To
whom is that psychological action to be
addressed?
Part of my case to you this morning

is that the Russians and Chinese are
attempting to make significant use of
legal-type arguments for psychological
purposes. These legal-type arguments
are being addressed to a wide variety of
audiences-first to their own citizens,
then to the citizens of countries to be
subjected to "wars of liberation," then
to the citizens of uncommitted countries, and last but certainly not least, to
our very own citizens. Within our own
country there is considerable debate
concerning the legality of our policies.
The casual reader of The New York
Times and other papers cannot fail to
have noticed ,the significant emphasis to
editorials as well as in full-page advertisements of arguments addressed to the
legality or illegality of our position in
Vietnam. Arguments as to the legality
or illegality of our actions in Santo
Domingo have touched off a considerable debate in our own Senate.
Provision of a legal framework for
our policies of counterinsurgency has
become, then, a serious task. We need to
present our own policies as clearly,
persuasively, and forcefully as possible
to our own people. Lack of persuasive
argument supporting our actions will
only lead to detraction from our
political and military effort within our
own country. A fortior~ we need a
persuasive legal framework in which to
set our actions for the benefit of other
states, and even for the. benefit of
people behind the iron curtain. Psychological warfare is important, and I am
suggesting to you, that the existence of
a persuasive legal argument in support
of our political and military actions is
an important element in that psychological operation.
Khrushchev, Che Guevara, and Lin
Piao have not created a concept devoid
of appeal and superficial justification in
this plan of "people's war" or "wars of
liberation." The concept is carefully
calculated to appeal to the notion,
historically so important to us, that the
right of revolution belongs inherently to
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every people against an unjust government. Just look at the way in which the
military dictionary attempts to distinguish between insurgency and subversive insurgency_ We cannot, with any
degree of plausibility, reject the concept
of the freedom of a people to revolt.
Immediately therefore, the concept of
"war of liberation" puts us somewhat
on the defensive. Revolution per se
cannot be unlawful. What then, are the
other identifiable element or elements
which, when added to revolution, make
it unlawful or subversive?
We may be tempted to respond with
the military dictionary-that element is
"communist inspiration." But such
"communist inspiration" may be hard
to define, and even harder to prove and
verify as a matter of factual report.
Furthermore, to many peoples of the
world, and perhaps to a number of our
own people, freedom to choose a government, or the right of self-determination, may well involve the right of a
people to choose if they wish, and that
wish is democratically established, a
government communist in form. For us
simply to take a position, therefore,
that all revolution is lawful, save only
that which is communist inspired, may
be a position substantially devoid of
plausibility or persuasiveness, not only
for world audiences but also for some of
our own. Perhaps we must look further
for those elements which, in addition to
revolution, are to make such revolution
into subversion or subversive aggression.
If the world were free of lawyers, you
may say, anyone could tell me that the
distinctive factor making the revolution
subversive is intervention from outside,
the export of revolution by one country
to another. Exported revolution is just
one specific form of aggression.
But is the problem quite that simple?
What actions constitute the "export" of
revolution? Consider for a moment a
few among the possible wide range of
activities which China, Russia, or Cuba
might take in relation to a country ripe

for revolution. First might COme a
propaganda campaign-in the presses,
over the radio, at diplomatic conferences, perhaps in the United Nations.
Perhaps part of this program, possibly
separate and distinct from it, might be
threats as to what action might be taken
if the revolution is not allowed to
blossom. Next might come the receiving
and training of revolutionaries, nationals
of the country involved. Is the training
of "students" in Cuba "interventionary
aggression" towards Venezuela? Next,
might come the supplying of materiel to
the revolutionary group, varying from
literature and food to arms. Next might
come the sending of a few "volunteers"
to help organize and train the rebelsnext, permission to use Cuba as a haven
for the indigenous rebel forces-and so
on. Where, in this list of actions, does
subversive aggression begin?
Let us pause for a moment, and look
briefly at the teachings of classical
international law. Has a practice developed which can be appropriately
used today as a yardstick in our battle
with wars of liberation?
The cornerstone of traditional international law is the concept of state
sovereignty-that is to say that, for the
most part, a state is entitled to manage
its own affairs free from direction or
intervention from outside states. This
particular concept is enshrined in
Article 2(7) of the United Nations
Charter: "Nothing contained in the
present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .... " At the
very next level of abstraction, this principle requires that each state and the
people of that state be free to determine
their own form of government, free
from any such external interference.
Said Professor Friedmann, one of the
most prestigious writers on international
law in this country, only last year:
" ... any attempt by a foreign power to
interfere with internal change, either by
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assisting rebels to overthrow the legitimate government, or by helping the
incumbent government to suppress a
rcvolution is contrary to international
law."2 Now I want you to note this
statement carefully. First, it makes clear
what the consensus of writing for centuries has made clear-that for an outside
state to lend assistance to a group of
rebels is to interfere illegally in the
internal affairs of the state in revolt.
Second, it makes assistance to the government in power resisting such revolt
equally as illegal as interference or
intervention. Third, what is proscribed
is "interference with internal change," a
phrase pregnant with triplets of ambiguity. What this particular quotation
does not say is that while states and
state departments for centuries have
been uttering these propositions, many
of the same states have, with some
degree of regularity, been conducting
their practice against very different criteria. The authors of the Holy Alliance
in 1815, the Emperors of Russia,
Austria, and the King of Prussia, essayed
a somewhat more practical statement of
policy by claiming the right to interfere
in the internal affairs of any country
threatened by revolution against the
legitimate sovereign. You will recall that
the Monroe Doctrine was formulated as
a response to that policy.
Now let me illustrate what some of
our own American authors are currently
doing with this material. Says the same
Professor Friedmann in another recent
article:
Since many of the internal conflicts, such as the internal disorders in Cyprus or the Congo,
have international implications
and may lead to the intervention
of antagonistic powers on different sides of the conflict, nonintervention on the part of outside powers is the most desirable
international policy which should,
as far as possible, be ensured by
nonintervention agreements be-

tween those concerned. The role
of the United Nations in these
conflicts will essentially be that of
a neutral forum for mediation. In
case of major intervention by outside powers, the U.N. may have to
be called in to keep the opposing
in terven tionists at arm's
length .... 3
Says Professor Falk of Princeton University:
... internal war rages in South
Vietnam, initiated by a series of
rather clandestine North Vietnamese guerrilla interventions and
countered by strident American
military intervention in apparent
violation of the 1954 Geneva
Accords. Interventionary policy
accounts for the most intense
forms of violent conflict present
in the world today.
The point is not to condemn these
interventions, but to suggest that a
foreign policy that depends upon
unilateral military interventions
by one nation in the affairs of
another usually violates clear
norms of international law ....
The willingness of the United
States to adopt illegal interventionary tactics, under the pressure
of the cold war, jeopardizes our
moral commitment to a foreign
policy of law-abidance, a commitment abstractly reiterated by our
statesmen from many rostrums. 4
Instead, he suggests this solution:
But international peace is not
only threatened by internal warfare. Peace is also endangered by
certain repressive social policies
which, if allowed to remain
unaltered, will produce serious
outbreaks of domestic violence.
This prospect prompts the central
contention of this essay-that the
United Nations should be authorized on a selective basis to
coerce domestic social changes.
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This authorization is what we
refer to throughout as legislative
intervention.5
It is interesting that, according to his
argument, what would be prohibited
intervention by one state becomes legal
when done in the name of the United
Nations.
The reason for giving you these
lengthy quotations is this: With respect,
I suggest that these scholars are striving
for some "neutral" principles by which
the affairs of the world can, in the
future, be peacefully regulated. The
search for such scholarly principles may
be important, but it fails substantially as
an exercise - in psychological warfare,
just as it apparently fails in an estimate
of political motivation in the world
today.
But notice how this search for neutral principles can distract attention
from a point of cardinal importance._ If
intervention in internal affairs of a state
is illegal, what facts must be established
to constitute proof of such intervention,
and what remedies are available once a
case of such intervention has been established? Given a clear plan of action for
wars of liberation as .described by Lin
Piao, surely the obvious psychological
counter, and surely a point of scholarly
concern, focuses on development of
criteria or standards for measuring external meddling, and on remedies for
violation of those standards. 6 And I
may say that the search for a remedy
that does not at the same time kill the
patient, is a task of monumental proportions.
Let me say again, however, that it is
important that such criteria be developed and argued, not in the belief
that Lin Piao will be convinced and will
change his mind, but rather as necessaries to answer foreign propaganda, or
for that matter, for our own domestic
consumption. Given the threat as defined by Khrushchev, Guevara, and Lin
Piao, I would also suggest that our
psychological response must involve the

reworking of the classic statement made
by Friedmann. We cannot afford endorsing a policy which may preclude
assistance to a government in power in
an effort to combat incipient stages of
subversion. At the same time, the statement of criteria for such assistance again
involves a monumental problem-to give
such support for the purpose of
countering subversion may at the same
time have the effect of impeding a truly
indigenous movement for social reform.
If some of our writers have been
more concerned with standards for a
law-abiding world than with developing
a psychological response to the concept
of people's war and wars of liberation,
what have the Russians been doing? In a
text on international law written in
Moscow and obligingly translated by the'
Russians into English and distributed
here in 1962, is to be found a discussion
of the so-called Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence. The Principles represent
the latest Russian use of legal analysis
for psychological purposes. You may,
for instance, be surprised to learn that:
Important principles of International Law such as the sovereign
equality of States, the selfdetermination of nations, noninterference in the internal affairs
of other countries, territorial integrity, peaceful coexistence and
cooperation between States regardless of their social systems
and the conscientious observance
of obligations assumed became
the guiding principles of the
world's first socialist State in its
international relations. 7
You may also be surprised at the following expansion on this theme:
The recognition of each people's
right to be master in its own
country-that is, its unconditional
right itself to decide its own social
and political system and to determine its internal and foreign
policy without any interference
whatsoever by other States-offers
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wide opportunities for fruitful
peaceful and mutually advantageous cooperation between
States, regardless of differences in
their social systems. In this lies
the importance of the principle of
nonintervention in the presentday world. 8
Professor Lipson of Yale has offered an
especially shrewd evaluation of the
psychological use by the Russians of
these concepts of peaceful coexistence. 9
He suggests that they are skillfully
blended to appeal first to the nationalis.t
aspirations of colonial and underdeveloped countries to make their own
way free, not only politically, but also
economically. Next they are designed to
appeal to audiences in the United States
and other western countries who would
like to see a lessening of tension, accompanied probably by disarmament or
reduction in military effort. Again, they
appeal to the Russian audience because
of the ideological split with China.
Thcse are words of peaceful competition with the West, rather than headstrong willful risk of nuclear war. In
short, the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are a masterful concoction of
psychological warfare. But notice the
gap between the promise and the fact.
Again, our counter seems to lie in
formulating the extent of that gap and
giving it factual documentation.
Of course, the authors of this
Russian text could not foresee that
Lin Piao would get a little out of
step in his speech, "Long Live the
Victory of the People's War." Says
he:
In the final analysis, the whole
cause of world revolution hinges
on the revolutionary struggles of
the Asian, African, and Latin
American peoples who make up
the overwhelming majority of the
world's population. The socialist
countries should regard it as their
internationalist duty to support
the people's revolutionary

struggles in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America. 1 0
None of this, I take it, is intended to
amount to interference in the internal
affairs of another state.
But enough of these relative abstractions. Let us come down to a couple of
specific illustrations of the importance
of legal argument in support of our
political and military decisions and
actions. Let us see something of the use
to which argumentation, hoth foreign
and domestic, puts legal-style analysis
and something of the kind of response
which is required of us. In the mail the
other day, I received an "Appeal to the
Lawyers of the World" from the International Association of Democratic
Lawyers, whose headquarters is in Brussels. This constitutes:
... a solemn appeal to our colleagues in the whole world urging
them to condemn the numerous
and grave violations on international law hy the war waged
against the Vietnamese people by
American imperialism.
(I) International law is violated
hy the systematic intervention of
the U.S.A. in the international
affairs of South Vietnam; hy the
installation of governments of
their choice, that are neither enjoying the confidence of the
people, nor being appointed
democratically, in contravention
of point 12 of the final declaration of the Geneva Conference
held in 1954 which was solemnly
agreed to by the representative of
the United States, Mr. Bedell
Smith, in the name of his government.
(2) International law is violated
by the military aggression
launched by the United States
against Vietnam; by the landing in
South Vietnam of foreign troops
that include U.S. nationals and
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units from S.E.A.T.O. or
A.N.Z.U.S. countries, committing
acts of war also against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam,
equally in contravention of point
12 already mentioned.
(3) International law is violated
when in the course of this aggressive war the United States is destroying schools, libraries, pagodas, churches and hospitals
under the false pretext of pursuing military aims; when the
American troops are making use
of horrible and prohibited
weapons such as noxious gases,
napalm, yellow phosphorous
bombs, dumdum bullets. All these
inhuman methods were banned by
the Hague Conventions of 1899
and by other international norms,
e.g., the Versailles Treaty of 28
June 1919 (art. 171), or the
Geneva Agreement of 17 July
1925.
(4) International law is violated
when prisoners are submitted to
humiliating and degrading treatment by the American troops, or
are savagely killed without judgment nor the legal guarantees
recognized as obligatory by all
civilized nations as well as by art.
3 of the Geneva Agreement of 12
August 1949; or when the same
American troops massacre the
civil population and submit them
to barbarous tortures. 11
And so on-the hand behind the pen is
clear.
Now, you are probably saying, that is
a concoction of lies to which our
response should be simply thatanswering such a document involves no
exercise in legal analysis and applied
psychology. To a considerable extent
you would be correct. But notice the
subtlety with which some of the issues
are woven in. Let us just take as an

example, the first paragraph I read you.
That we have a large army in Vietnam is
clear, and that the presence of such an
army has a substantial effect on the
internal affairs of Vietnam is equally
clear. Is this "intervention"? Well, you
say, our response rests on the fact that
we were requested to help hy the
Vietnamese government. But then
notice that the same paragraph suggests
that our host or inviting government is
in fact our own puppet, which has not
been "democratically appointed" in accordance with the Geneva Accord of
1954. You suspect that the Ky regime
was, in fact, not appointed by a 51
percent or better majority of every
adult entitled and willing to vote in
South Vietnam. So to counter this, you
begin an argument that, in an underdeveloped and undereducated country
or community, full-flowered democracy
is a factual impossibility. Besides, you
say, look at Ho Chi Minh. Now this
second argument is interesting. With the
audiences to which this material is
presented, the argument that the other
side is doing the same bad things, is
peculiarly unpersuasive. The first argument is the one whieh needs to be
presented, but notice the technique.
The charges are so framed, that an
accurate response becomes so detailed,
intricate, and tied in with-legal argumentation that the audience may be lost in
the middle of the answer.
The aim of this material is to confuse. And the answer or psychological
counter is not a point by point refutation of their thesis-rather, it should or
even must be found in a coherent
policy. We should be in a position to
explain what that policy is-that it has a
measure of objectivity-that is to say
that it is not an action adopted ad hoc,
but is the application of principles
established as such and consistently
advocated and followed by us in. our
foreign relations. Such a policy requires
focusing on the concept of "war of
liberation," upon the fact of external
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interference with the political balance in
South Vietnam by Ho Chi Minh and the
Chinese-this involves the development
of criteria, mentioned earlier, against
which we can judge and establish such
interference, and it requires the development and advocacy of remedies to be
taken in the face of such interference
violative of our proclaimed standards.
Law is the antithesis of arbitrary action
-and legal analysis and argumentation,
to be persuasive, must be founded in
consistency of principle and, as far as
possible, in application of such principle.
Now, you are probably saying, who
needs to respond to a position like that
of the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers? It is, and this
must be patent to the reader, a tissue of
lies. First, you are on notice that the
Russians are a eareful, calculating group,
who do not do many things without
apparent object. They think this kind of
propaganda is worthwhile-be careful of
underestimating their judgment. Remember the message of this counterinsurgency program-that the battle is
one for people, and the people of that
phrase are being exposed to this kind of
argumentation. That it needs answering
in foreign audiences can best be illustrated by referring to the extent to
which some of the arguments therein
advanced have received a measure of
support and sympathy within our very
own country. Let me read to you a
short passage from a speech delivered on
September 23,1965:
In Vietnam, we have totally
flouted the rule of law, and we
have flouted the United Nations
Charter. This lip service given by
the United States to the United
Nations and its international law
provisions and procedures has
done our country great injury
among many international lawyers
around the world. Our waging an
undeclared war in southeast Asia
in flagrant violation of our oft-

expressed pretense that the
United States stands for the substitution of the rule of law for the
jungle law of the military claw in
meeting threats to the peace of
the world, has done great damage
to our reputation for reliability in
international affairs. Our good
reputation in world affairs previously held by millions of people
in the underdeveloped areas of the
world has been tarnished by our
unjustified warmaking in southeast Asia. 1 2
These are words of the Honorable
Wayne Morse spoken on the floor of our
Senate. It seems we have something of a
missionary job to do in our own country!
Now, for a second illustration of the
importance of legal analysis, let us'look
at another recent counterinsurgency
situation-the Dominican Republic.
Remember that the thesis is this: Our
political and military actions need to be
explained by an argument of their
legality presented as persuasively as possible.
What we had, obviously, in the
Dominican Republic, was an incipient
political revolution. I take it that there
was and is little doubt that substantial
numbers of citizens of the Dominican
Republic were so dissatisfied with their
existing government that they proposed
to resort to revolution as an answer. Our
problem was equally obvious. The existence of a fighting civil war provides an
excellent opportunity for communist
trained, and perhaps even exported,
leaders to penetrate and then take over
one of the forces in the revolution. The
communist handbook is simple and
direct in ordering party members to
capitalize, however and whenever possible, on issues that are politically
divisive. Their ability to so capitalize
can be illustrated all the way from
Cuba, even to perhaps some of our
university campuses. But, and this is
important, we were not in a position to
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deny that there was an indigenous revolution-that people of the Republic
were asserting their freedom, as a last
resort, to revolt against what they considered to be an unfair and unrepresentative government What then, could we
make by way of legal argument to
explain that our intervention was not
inconsistent with or destructive of this
inherent right of revolution, while still
taking steps of military intervention
deemed by our government necessary to
prevent communist subversion of this
indigenous revolution? Said Mr. Meeker,
the Legal Adviser to the State Department:
We landed troops in the Dominican Republic in order to preserve
the lives of foreign nationalsnationals of the United States and
many other countries. We continued our military presence in
the Dominican Republic for the
additional purpose of preserving
the capacity of the OAS to function in the manner intended by
the OAS Charter-to achieve
peace and justice through securing
a cease-fire and through reestablishing orderly political processes
within which Dominicans could
choose their own government,
free from outside interference. 13
Now this statement of our position is
not without its difficulties, in terms of
psychological persuasion. Notice first,
its apparent inconsistency with the concept of ultimate freedom of revolt. This
appears to say that if you revolt, we
reserve the right to step in and prevent
the fighting so that a new government
may be chosen democratically, i.e., by
supervised voting, after debate and discussion of the problem and the proposed party platforms. This indeed, is
the advocacy of a principle considerably
adapted from that of the ultimate freedom to revolt. Notice also, that any
such "police" intervention may have a
significant effect on the relative strength
in any subsequent election of the

government previously in power and the
rebel group.
The cornerstone of our political and
military decision is clear. We are all too
well acquainted with the communist
pattern of infiltration and subversion,
and for our purposes, it does not much
matter whether that infiltration is effected by Dominicans or by communist
operatives brought in from other countries. The thing that counts in the end is
simply this: Does the government ultimately achieving power answer directly
to communist centers? Is it subservient
to communist control, and will it take
communist steps to prevent any future
unfortunate revolt or attempt a democratic selection of government? In short,
will the establishment of such government preclude for the future a free
demonstration of political choice by the
people of the country?
The selection of a cornerstone of
legal analysis, of the most persuasive
argument in explanation of this policy,
is much more complex. Our statement
and repetition of patterns of communist
behavior fails to persuade many of our
own citizens, let alone many Latin
American audiences. Moscow says they
did not have anything to do with a
take-over of any revolution, and we, as
the active intervening parties, are suddenly cast with the burden of proof to
establish as the price of legalizing our
position, that, in fact, the revolution
was being substantially affected or controlled by infiltrated communist operatives. That is no mean burden of proof.
On the other hand, if (and I am not
necessarily saying we should), we
adopted the following proposition as
our neutral principle or policy, we could
avoid the foregoing burden of proof
problem. That principle might be: Wherever possible, widespread civil war and
bloodshed should be forestalled by intervention of a police force designed to
keep the peace while at the same time
laying a basis for future democratically
organized and supervised elections. We
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could then rely simply on the outhreak
of suhstantial civil war and widespread
hloodshed and hreakdown of the essential processes of government For such a
principle to he effective, however, we
have to he in a position to argue that
this is not a policy conceived on the
spur of the moment to take care of this
specific incident-in short, that it is a
policy we plan on adhering to consistently. And if this policy were to he
selected as such principle, it must he
capahle of withstanding analysis and
criticism.
Without looking up any official document on statement, I could give you the
gist of a Russian response. But, in this
instance, that is unnecessary since we
have vocal criticism of the policy in the
Dominican Repuhlic right here at home.
Our policies or principles are heing put
to the test of analysis and criticism right
here, as well as hefore foreign audiences.
Senator Fulhright has said of our
actions there:
The prospect of an election in
nine months, which may conceivahly produce a strong democratic
government, is certainly reassuring
on this score, hut the [fact] remains that the reaction of the
United States at the time of acute
crisis was to intervene forcibly
and illegally against a revolution,
which, had we sought to influence
it instead of suppressing it, might
have produced a strong popular
government without foreign military intervention.
Since just ahout every revolutionary movement is likely to
attract Communist support, at
least in the heginning, the approach followed in the Dominican
Repuhlic, if consistently pursued,
must inevitahly make us the
enemy of all revolutions and
therefore the ally of all the unpopular and corrupt oligarchies of
the hemisphere.! 4

In contrast, Under Secretary of State
Mann has said:
When in other words, a Communist state has intervened in the
internal affairs of an American
state hy training, directing, financing, and organizing indigenous Communist elements to take
control of the government of an
American state hy force and violence, should other American
states he powerless to lend assistance? Are Communists free to
intervene while democratic states
are powerless to frustrate that
intervention?! 5
From the point of view of legal
analysis and persuasive argument, hoth
these statements are interesting. The
Senator's statement hrands our action as
"illegal," without amplification. That
such amplification could he provided is
clear. The introduction of our army into
the country of another state calls for
the clearest of supporting arguments to
escape the charge of illegality. And the
fact that a political faction in the
Dominican Repuhlic decided to invite
us adds a little, hut not very much in
the circumstances, to our position. On
the other hand, Secretary Mann's analysis assumes that communist "indoctrination" of certain political rehels, who
might very well have heen natives of the
Repuhlic, constituted intervention
which, impliedly, authorized us to take
a counterremedy in the form of an
armed landing. Perhaps, in the long run,
the most persuasive argument runs along
lines suggested hy Mr. Mann, rather than
along lines of a principle of preventing
hloodshed and facilitating free elections.
Suffice it to say that we need a
coherent and consistent policy. Senator
Fulhright underlines the importance of
such a policy consistently applied when
he says that potential revolutionaries in
Latin America may regard our action in
the Dominican Repuhlic as an explicit
declaration of our position in favor of
status quo government, no matter how
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bad it may be, and against revolution.
And so, we come back full circle to the
problem: how to formulate a policy to
best support our political and military
decisions taken in the context of counterinsurgency-how to distinguish in
that policy between freedom of revolution and proscription of wars of liberation and people's war.
That problem is reported to be under
consideration in our discussions with
Latin American countries, as late as last
Thursday. The New York Times of that
day! 6 carries a story of Mexican views
on a proposal for collective Latin
American action in the event of complete breakdown of order and authority
in one of the OAS states.
Fortunately, this morning, I have the
luxury of criticizing the statements and
writings of others, without any accompanying responsibility for defining
policy goals in this area. There are,
however, several factors which will, in
my opinion, continue to affect the
search for most effective policies and
legal analyses to counter the threats
posed by wars of liberation.
First, the persuasiveness of any legal
analysis is important to our domestic
population. The ability to offer a clear
and consistent purpose, rationale, and
demonstration of its application to any
current fact situation will have significant impact on the domestic support
which political and military decisions
receive from our own population. For
this reason, such purposes and policies
must be consistent with our domestic
governmental ethic. That ethic clearly
believes in a right of revolution, and in
the right of a people to choose their
own form of government. This means
freedom from communist subversion,
but it also means freedom from United
States support of unpopular and dictatorial regimes. Our counterinsurgency
policy deals with stability of governments, but it must be so framed as to
distinguish, as far as is possible, between
indigenous revolution and communist

subversion. Not every act of subversion
can be allowed to taint a revolutionary
group and we must refine a policy
tailored to identify and brand those
aspects of wars of liberation which seek
to climb on the back of an indigneous
movement.
Second, to be as persuasive as possible, our policy must seek to share
counterinsurgency responsibility, as far
and as widely as possible. By way of
illustration, the function of a lawyer in
the Department of State would have
been fantastically easier if the force
which went into the Dominican Republic had been an OAS force, sent there
pursuant to a resolution of that organization, and in implementation of a
stable and consistent policy against insurgency formulated by that organization. Such a sharing of responsibility
requires that our policy be consistent
then, not only with our own domestic
ethic, but consistent, as far as is possible, with corresponding ethics outside
the communist countries. We must
recognize that in these other countries,
which in many cases are backward and
underdeveloped, revolution continues to
play an important function in change
and reform of government. Our policy
cannot condemn revolution as such,
even when accompanied by bloodshed,
nor can it condemn revolution merely
on the grounds that communist groups
have joined in with it.
Third, that policy must bring sharply
into focus not only the problem of
identifying what constitutes illegal intervention through communist subversion,
but also the ingredients of appropriate
remedies for any such violation of the
established policy.
Fourth, we must recognize that consistent application of this policy is
important, and that departures from it,
to meet the stresses of ad hoc situations
of the moment, may be very costly in
the long-run effectiveness of the psychological purpose.
Fifth, we must continue to recognize
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that such a policy does serve a psychological purpose of importance hoth with our
own people and ahroad. But the ohject of
having the policy is not to seek ahstract

standards to govern in a perfect law-abiding world, hut rather to meet the practical day-to-day threats posed, and to he
posed, hy wars ofliheration.
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